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Abstract 
We prove that P ≠ NP by proving the existence of a class of functions we call Τ 
(Greek Tau), each of whose members satisfies the conditions of one-way functions. 
Each member of Τ is a function computable in polynomial time, with negligible 
probability of finding its inverse by any polynomial probabilistic algorithm. We also 
prove that no polynomial-time algorithm exists to compute the inverse of members of 
Τ, and that the problem of computing the inverse of Τ cannot be reduced to FSAT in 
polynomial time. 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents a proof that P ≠ NP by proving of the existence of a class of 
functions we call Τ (Greek Tau), each of whose members satisfies the conditions of 
one-way functions. Each member of Τ is a function computable in polynomial time, 
with negligible probability of finding its inverse by any polynomial-time probabilistic 
algorithm. This is accomplished by constructing each τ ∊ Τ with a collection of 
independent universal hash functions that produce a starting coordinate and path 
within a sequence of unique random bit matrices. 
 The existence of one-way functions has been an open question in computer 
science. This is due to the fact that, given a candidate function, it is hard to prove that 
any polynomial-time random algorithm that attempts to find any member of the 
inverse of the candidate, has a negligible probability of success, where such 
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probability is a function of the size of the input. To prove this, it is important to prove 
that no algorithm that is able to find the inverse of the candidate function runs in 
polynomial time; otherwise, such algorithm can be simulated by a probabilistic 
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm with full certainty. Also, the proof of the non-
existence of such algorithm in FP makes our proof not to rely on the assumption of 
the resolution of the P vs. NP problem (which would be a recursive, non-constructive 
proof). 
Since every solution of the inverse of a one-way function can be verified in 
polynomial time (the FNP class), the existence of a one-way function means that 
there are problems in FNP that do not have a polynomial-time algorithm (the FP 
class) for finding the inverse. Thus, the existence of one-way functions implies that 
FP ≠ FNP, and thus P ≠ NP. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the 
foundational definitions used in our proofs. In Section 3, the Tau functions class is 
presented. A survey of related works is presented in Section 4. A definition of the Τ-
INV and H-INV problems are presented in sections 5 and 6, respectively. In Section 
7, we prove that some instances of Τ-INV cannot be reduced to FSAT in polynomial 
time. In Section 8, we present lower bounds for the worst-time complexity of Τ-INV, 
followed in Section 9 by a proof of the one-wayness of all members of Τ. Our 
conclusions are presented in Section 10. 
2. Definitions 
A universal hash family H is defined as a set of hash functions 
H = { h : U → M |  U ∊ {0,1}n , M ∊ {0,1,…,m}, m < 2n}   
that satisfies the following property: 
       
 ∀x,y ∊ U, x≠y  Pr [ h(x) = h(y) ]  ≤   1/m 
    h∊U 
 
which means that any two members of U collide with probability at most 1/m. 
Universal hash functions provide the guarantee that, for any S ⊆ U, and for any x,y ∊ 
S, the expected number of values of y that satisfy h(x)=h(y) is n/m [CW77]. 
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A function f : {0,1}* → {0,1}* is one-way if and only if it can be computed in 
polynomial time, but any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm F- will only 
succeed in finding the inverse of f with negligible probability. More formally, f is 
one-way iff: 
 Pr [ f(F-(f,unary(n),f(x))) = f(x) ] < n-c 
 x∊{0,1}n 
 
where: 
1. F- is a PPT algorithm that attempts to find the inverse of f(x) 
2. n =⎾log2(x)⏋(the number of bits in x) 
3. unary(n) is an all-ones bit string of size n, used by F- to set an upper bound 
in its search 
4. c is any positive integer 
Intuitively, the asymptotic value of Pr as a function of n, will always be less than the 
asymptotic value of any polynomial of n, as n tends to infinity. 
3. The Tau (Τ) Functions Class 
We define the class of functions Τ (Greek Tau) as the set of functions  
 
T = { τ | τ : {0,1}n → {0,1}n }, 
 
where each τ is constructed as follows: 
 
1. Construct a sequence M of n matrices M=(M0,M1,…,Mn), each one of size n x 
n, where each element is a random bit, bits in each matrix are uniformly 
distributed, and each Mi ∊ M is unique. 
2. Pick randomly a sequence of n hash functions Hτrow = (hrow1,hrow2..hrown),  
from a universal hash family: { h : {0,1}n → {0,1}log(n) }  
3. Pick randomly a sequence of n hash functions Hτcol = (hcol1,hcol2..hcoln),  from a 
universal hash family: { h : {0,1}n → {0,1}log(n) }  
4. Construct an n x n matrix HM of hash functions by picking randomly from a 
universal hash family: { h : {0,1}n → {0,1}3 } 
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5. Construct an 8 x 2 matrix D with the following values, each of which 
represents a moving direction along coordinates in a matrix in M: 
|  1  0  |  (up) 
|  -1 0  |  (down) 
|  0 -1 |  (left) 
|  0 1 |  (right) 
|  -1 -1 |  (up,left) 
|  -1 1 |  (up,right) 
|  1 -1 |  (down,left) 
|  1 1 |  (down,right) 
 
All hash functions constructed for τ follow Carter and Wegman’s construction 
[CW77] of the form: 
((ax + b) mod p) mod t 
 
where: 
1. p is an n-bit prime number chosen at random, with the condition p > 2 
2. a is an integer chosen at random, with the condition 0 < a < p 
3. b is an integer chosen at random, with the condition 0 < bi < p 
4. t=n for all the members of Hτrow and Hτcol; and t=8 for all the members of HM 
 
Each hi in any collection (sequence or matrix) CH of universal hash functions in τ is 
subject to the following constraints: 
1. Each hi should be unique within CH. That is, for any two distinct hi,hj ∊ CH,  
ai≠aj bi≠bj and pi≠pj. 
2. Each hi should be independent from any other hj in CH. That is, given two 
distinct hi,hj in CH, (aix + bi) ≠ k(ajx + bj) for any integer k>0. 
 
Once constructed, each τ maps an input x in {0,1}n  to an output y in {0,1}n by the 
following algorithm Aτ. 
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1. Let the output y initially be an empty binary sequence 
2. For each i ∊ (1,2,…,n): 
a. Let hri be the ith hash function in Hτrow 
b. Let hci be the ith hash function in Hτcol 
c. Let r = hri(x)+1 
d. Let c = hci(x)+1 
e. Let Mi be the ith matrix in the bit-matrix sequence M 
f. Let (r,c) represent a (row,column) coordinate in Mi 
g. For each j = (1,2,…n) 
i. Let hd(i,j) be the hash function from the matrix HM 
ii. Let d = hd(i,j)(x)+1 
iii. Let rΔ = D(d,1) 
iv. Let cΔ = D(d,2) 
v. Let r = r + rΔ  
vi. Let c = c + cΔ   
vii. If either r,c are less than one, let it be equal to n  
viii. If either r,c are greater than n, let it be equal to 1 
ix. Let b = Mi(r,c) (the bit at the coordinate (r,c) in Mi) 
x. Append b to the output y 
3. τ (x) = y 
  
Lemma 1: For every τ in Τ, the algorithm Aτ computes τ in polynomial time. 
Proof:  
1. All the variable assignment and hashing steps are O(1) 
2. Step 2 computes y in O(n2), since: 
a. The outer loop in Step 2 is linear in n, thus it is O(n). 
b. Step 2.g is linear in n, thus it is O(n) 
c. The complexity of the outer loop in terms of the inner loop is O(n 
times (n + k)) for some k >1, so it is O(n2) . 
3. The sum of the complexities of the sequential steps is O(n2)  
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4. Related Works 
The construction of one-way functions has been the subject of extensive research in 
the past three decades, especially with applications in cryptography [L03]. Most of 
the possible-one-way function constructions for cryptographic applications are based 
on the assumption of the existence of one-way functions. Good surveys of application 
of one-way hash functions in cryptography can be found in [IZM90] and [NY89].   
Our work is closely related to the use of random predicates [G00] and expander 
graphs [CLG09] in the use of a random walk along a graph to generate the value of 
the output of a hash function. One obvious difference is that our proposed functions 
are not hash functions. Disregarding this fact, our work is related to the use of random 
predicates in the sense that the output of the function is a composition of bits 
generated from random predicates; however, our constructions are based on random 
walks using the output of several unique hash functions, which avoids the need to use 
a lookup table to store the mappings of random predicates. In the case of expander 
graphs, the random walk is made along a set of vertices, each of which represents an 
elliptic curve, and the “current” input bit is used to decide between two isogenous 
curves. The output of the hash is a function of the j-invariant of the last vertex of the 
random walk. The one-wayness of functions based on this kind of expander graphs 
depends on the assumption of the hardness of finding isogeneous elliptic curves, 
which is an NP-complete problem; thus, the proof of one-wayness is dependent on the 
resolution of the P vs. NP problem. 
Our work is also related to previous work based on composition of universal hash 
functions. In [SV00] such compositions are intended to build one-way cryptographic 
hash functions that break a message into independent sequences for which a set of 
randomly-picked universal hash functions are applied and whose output concatenated 
to produce the hashed output. In [BP97], the composition is made by breaking the 
input into fixed-sized strings to which distinct hash functions are applied, each of 
whose output is used to compose the function’s output by application of other hashes 
to the outputs in cascade (either linearly or from a tree), being the final output the 
result of the hash function in the last stage. Notice that in neither of these works, 
traversals through a sequence of distinct random bit matrices are used.  
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5. The Tau-Inverse (Τ-INV) problem 
We define Τ-INV as the problem of finding the inverse of a member τ  of Τ, given 
a member y of the image of τ. More formally, we define it as: 
Τ-INV(τ,y) = { x | y = τ(x) , τ ∊ Τ } 
For the sake of consistency and to avoid repeating definitions in the rest of this 
paper, we will define the following. We shall use y to represent a member of the 
image of τ, and define it as a sequence of bits (y1,…,yn), where n is the number of 
bits, and y1 is the left-most bit (this last definition is arbitrary and is used only for 
visualization purposes).  
We define H as the set of universal hash functions used to build τ. More formally, 
H = Hτrow U Hτcol  U HM. We shall use hi to designate a member of H, where i is the 
index of the member, corresponding to the ith bit of y. When necessary, we shall 
clarify the context in which hi is used, or as a more specific member on either Hτrow, 
Hτcol or HM.  
To simplify our analysis, when appropriate, we shall make O(1) oracle 
assumptions when establishing bounds in time complexities. Such assumptions are 
pertinent when proving exponential bounds, as constant and polynomial components 
are negligible as an exponential function grows asymptotically.   
6. The H-Inverse (H-INV) problem 
We define H-INV as the problem of finding all the members of the preimage of 
hi-(m), where hi is a member of H, as previously defined, and m is a member of the 
image of hi.  More formally, we define it as: 
H-INV(hi,m) = { x | m = hi(x) , hi ∊ H } 
Lemma 2: Let M be the image of hi ∊ H and |M| = 2t for some t > 0.  Any 
algorithm A-H(hi,m) that solves H-INV for hi and m ∊ M has a lower-bound time 
complexity bounded by Ω(2n). 
Proof: Due to the universal nature of hi, there is a guarantee that all members of 
its preimage are uniformly mapped to the members of its image. Thus, for any of its 
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outputs, the size of the preimage is 2n/2t = 2n-t. The size of the output of A-H  will be 
2n-t , thus the execution time to produce the output is bounded by Ω(2n). 
Corollary 1: Any algorithm that solves Τ-INV by invoking H-INV will have a 
best-case execution exponential time, bounded by Ω(2n). 
7. Reducing Τ-INV to FSAT is not in P 
Reducing the problem of finding the inverse of a one-way function candidate to 
formula satisfiability (FSAT) would be a means of solving Τ-INV in polynomial 
time, if one can prove that P=NP. Since any τ in Τ can be implemented by a 
polynomial-size circuit, there exist a Boolean formula φ that represents τ. However, a 
polynomial-size circuit does not guarantee a polynomial size for φ; in fact, the 
immense majority of Boolean functions have a formula size that is exponential in n 
[S38].  
We shall construct our proofs using the following definitions: 
1. Rτ(x,y) is a relation that represents a τ in Τ, such that <x,y> ∊ Rτ if and 
only if τ(x) = y. 
2. The expression xy is the concatenation of a pair <x,y> in Rτ, where 
both x and y are zero-padded to the left to ensure that their length is n. 
3. The expression xy ⊕ x’y’ represents a bit-wise XOR operation of xy 
and x’y’. 
4. The function OC(s) is defined as OC : {0,1}* → N and computes the 
number of ones in the bit string s. 
5. A predicate IR(xy) (meaning that xy is irreducible) is true if there does 
not exist <x’,y’> in Rτ such that x’y’ ≠ xy and OC(xy ⊕ x’y’) = 1. 
6. The set SIR(τ) is defined as SIR(τ) = { xy | <x,y> ∊ Rτ and IR(xy) } 
 
Lemma 3: There exist instances τ in Τ for which |SIR(τ)| > 2n/k,  where k is an 
odd integer constant and 2 < k < n.  
Proof: Each τ is a total function, i.e. is defined for all members of its domain. 
Thus, there are 2n members in Rτ(x,y). The domain of τ contains values x = tk, where 
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t={0…(2n-1)/k}.  Each one of such values can map to a value y=u(k+2), where 
u={1…(2n-1)/(k+2)) (such mapping does not have to be one-to-one and in any 
specific order). For the values of x ≠ tk, as defined above, each one can map to a 
value y=w(k+4), where w={1..(2n-1)/(k+4)) (once again, such mapping does not have 
to be one-to-one and in any specific order). Such a distribution of values guarantees 
that the predicate IR(xy) is true for at least 2n/k mappings, thus |SIR(τ)| > 2n/k. 
Lemma 4: Reducing Τ-INV to FSAT is not in P.  
Proof: We proved in Lemma 3 that there exist instances in τ  in Τ for which 
|SIR(τ)| > 2n/k. Mapping such instances to a Boolean formula in CNF results in an 
exponential number of irreducible clauses, as each of such clauses correspond to a 
member of SIR(τ). Any TM that produces the formula will spend an exponential time 
producing the output. For a problem to be in P, all instances must have an algorithm 
that solves it in polynomial time. Thus, reducing Τ-INV to FSAT is not in P. 
8. Worst-Case Lower Bound for Computing Τ-INV  
We can always convert a deterministic Turing Machine (TM) into a Probabilistic 
TM where two random transitions from the same state bring the same output and have 
the same next state in common. Thus, we want to prove that solving the inverse of τ is 
not in FP, thus justifying the need of a PPT algorithm to compute the inverse in 
average polynomial time.  
Lemma 5: Any deterministic algorithm Aτ- that attempts to find a member of the 
inverse of a function τ ∊ Τ, has a worst-case execution time bounded by Ω(2n). 
Proof: Let hi be any of the hash functions used to construct τ. For the purpose of 
analysis, let AO(τ,wi,j) be an O(1) oracle that finds the jth element of a sequence of 
members of the preimage hi-(wi). Let y = τ(x) for some x in the domain of τ. Let yi be 
the ith bit of y. Each yi is produced by a bit from the corresponding matrix Mi, which 
resulted from the last step of a traversal, given by the value wi ∊ {0..7} of a hash 
function hi in τ. Since Aτ- is deterministic, it has to pick one of eight possible hash 
values that lead to yi and invoke the oracle AO(τ,wi,j), where wi ∊ {0..7} and j ∊ 
{1..2n/8} (as there can be as many as 2n/8 elements in the preimage hi- due to the 
uniform distribution resulting from the universality of hi). To find a member x of the 
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inverse τ-(y), Aτ- will need to find a value of x that produces a yi in y. In the worst 
case, such an x will be obtained by the j=2n/8 call to the oracle AO(τ,wi,j). Thus, the 
worst-case execution time of Aτ- has a lower bound of Ω(2n). 
Corollary 2: Τ-INV is not in FP. 
9. All members of τ are One-Way Functions  
In this section, we shall prove that all members of Τ are one-way functions. 
Lemma 6: Let y = τ(x) for some x ∊ {0,1}n. Let HM be the matrix of universal 
functions used to construct τ, and let HMi be the ith row of the HM. Let hi ∊ HMi, where 
i ∊ {1,2,…n}, let yi be the ith bit of y. Let (di1,di2,…,din) be the output of each 
respective hi for an x in the domain of τ, which defined the path to yi. Let Fi be the 
event of finding at random one element from the preimage τ -({y}) with a path to yi.  
The probability of Fi is given by: 
  Pr[Fi]  = 1/8n 
Proof: Since hi in HM is member of a universal family of hash functions, it is 
guaranteed that the size of the preimage |hi-({yi})| = 2n/8. The size of the domain of  
hi is 2n, thus the probability of finding an x in the preimage hi-({yi}) is 2n/(2n/8) = 1/8. 
Since all hash functions are independent, the probability of finding an x common to 
all hi is given by: 
Pr[Fi] = Π(Pr[x ∊hi-({yi})]) =   Π(1/8)  = 1/8n    
                 i           i    i = {1,2,…n} 
 
Lemma 7: Let y = τ(x), yi, HM, HMi and hi be as defined in Lemma 6.  Let Fi be 
the event of finding at random one element from the preimage τ -({y}) with a path to 
yi.  . Let Fj be the event of finding at random one element from the preimage τ -({y}) 
with a path to yj,  and i≠j. The probability of Fi given Fj, when Fi ≠ Fj, is given by: 
Pr[Fi | Fj] = α ∙ 1/8n 
for some constant 0 < α < 1. 
Proof:  We know that: 
   Pr[Fi | Fj] = Pr[Fi∩Fj] / Pr[Fj] 
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and Pr[Fk] = 1/8n for all k = {1,…,n}, and that Fj ⊄ Fi. Since we are assuming some 
degree of dependency between Fi and Fj (otherwise the conditional probability would 
be zero), it follows that 
Pr[Fi∩Fj] = α ∙ 1/8n ∙ 1/8n  
for some constant 0 < α < 1. Replacing in the equation yields to: 
 Pr[Fi | Fj] = α ∙ 1/8n 
Lemma 8: Let y = τ(x) for some x in the domain of τ. Let Fi be the event of 
finding at random one element from the preimage hi-({yi}). Let F-i be intersection: 
F-i =  ∩Fk    
             k≠i  
 
The probability of F-i is given by: 
Pr[F-i] = β ∙ (1/8(n^2-n)) 
for some constant 0 < β < 1. 
Proof: From Lemma 6, we know that Pr[Fk] = 1/8n for all k = {1,…,n}. Since we 
are assuming some dependency among events, the probability of the intersection is 
given by: 
   Pr[F-i] = β Π(Pr[Fk]) 
          k≠i 
for some constant 0 < β < 1. Thus, 
   Pr[F-i] = β ∙ (1/8n)(n-1) 
which is equivalent to  
   Pr[F-i] = β ∙ (1/8(n^2-n))  
  
Lemma 9: Let Fi and F-i be as defined in Lemmas 6 and 7.  The probability of Fi 
given F-i is given by: 
Pr[Fi | F-i] = γ ∙ 1/8n 
Proof: We know that  
  Pr[Fi | F-i] = Pr[Fi ∩ F-i] / Pr[F-i] 
from Lemma 7. 
Pr[Fi ∩ F-i]  = α ∙ 1/8n ∙ 1/8(n^2-n) 
for some constant 0 < α < 1. From Lemma 8: 
   Pr[F-i] = β ∙ (1/8(n^2-n))  
Replacing in the formula above gives: 
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Pr[Fi | F-i] = α ∙ 1/8n ∙ 1/8(n^2-n) / (β ∙ (1/8(n^2-n))) 
which brings: 
Pr[Fi | F-i] = γ ∙ 1/8n 
where γ  = α / β and 0 < γ < 1. 
Lemma 10: Let y, yi and Fi be as defined in Lemma 6.  Let F be the event of 
finding at random one member of the preimage τ-({y}). The probability of F is given 
by: 
   Pr[F] = Pr[∩Fi] 
          i 
Proof: Each yi is produced independently by a set of x in the preimage τ-({y}). 
However, due to the universal-hash guarantee and the distinct parameters of each 
hash function in τ, there exists an x that produces a bit in y but does not produce same 
bit value in another bit of y. Thus, the preimage τ-({y}) is given by the intersection of 
the independent preimages for each bit yi in y. 
With these lemmas proved, we are now in a position to prove that all members of 
Τ are one-way functions. 
Theorem 1: Let y = τ(x) for some x ∊ {0,1}n. Let F be the event of finding at 
random one member of the preimage τ-({y}). The probability of F is bounded by: 
Pr[F] < n-c 
where c is any positive integer. 
Proof: From Lemma 10, we know that the probability of F is given by: 
   Pr[F] = Pr[∩Fi]    i ∊ {1,2,…n} 
      i 
which is equivalent to: 
   Pr[F] = Pr[F1 ∩ F2 … ∩ Fn] 
 
Given two distinct Fi and Fj, the probability of their intersection is given by: 
  
   Pr[Fi ∩ Fj] = Pr[Fi | Fj] Pr[Fj] 
 
By the chain rule for multiple intersections of sets, the probability of F in terms of the 
intersection of all Fi is given by: 
 
Pr[F] = Pr[∩Fi] = Pr[Fn | Fn-1 ∩ Fn-2 … F1] ∙ Pr[Fn-1 | Fn-2 ∩ Fn-3 … F1] .. ∙ Pr[F1] 
              i 
Since Pr[Fi] = 1/8n for any Fi (Lemma 6), then: 
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Pr[∩Fi] = Pr[Fn | Fn-1 ∩ Fn-2 … F1] ∙ Pr[Fn-1 | Fn-2 ∩ Fn-3 … F1] .. ∙ 1/8n  
       i 
 
We proved in Lemma 7 that Pr[Fi | F-i] = γ ∙ 1/8n for some constant 0 < γ  1 and any  
F-i that is the intersection of all Fj ≠ Fi. Thus, Pr[Fi | F-i] = 1/βi for all Fi, for some 
constant βi > 1. Replacing each term in the equation above with its equivalent 1/βi: 
 
Pr[∩Fi] = 1/8n∙Π(1/βi)     i = {1,2,…,n} 
       i             i 
 
Since each term in the Π operation is less than one, then: 
 
Pr[∩Fi]  ≤  1/αn     i = {1,2,…,n} 
       i           
 
where α = max(β1, β2,…, βn). Therefore, 
 
Pr[F]  ≤  1/αn     
 
for some constant α > 1. Since Pr[F] is inversely exponential in n, it follows that: 
 
Pr[F] < n-c 
 
Corollary 3: Each τ ∊ Τ is a one-way function. 
 
10. Conclusion 
We have proved that P ≠ NP presented with the proof of the existence of a class 
of functions Τ, each of whose members satisfies the conditions of one-way functions. 
Each member in Τ is constructed with a collection of independent universal hash 
functions that produce a starting coordinate and path within a sequence of unique bit 
matrices. A proof of the exponential lower bound of worst-case complexity of finding 
the inverse of members of Τ was presented. We also proved that the problem of 
finding the preimage of each member in Τ is not polynomial-time reducible to FSAT. 
It was also proved that any random algorithm that attempts to find the inverse of any 
function in Τ has negligible probability of success, thus proving that all members of Τ 
are one-way functions. 
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